The Cod Wars are not just a typo when spelling Cold War (although the conflicts are, incredibly, related), but rather an ocean-spanning conflict that brewed for centuries. Disputes over the fishing rights of British ships near the waters of Iceland was one of Europe’s longest points of friction until it finally came to a fiery, deadly head in the mid 20th century—and ended in a victory for the country lacking a military.
Fishing trips from Great Britain had been braving the Atlantic to fish around Iceland since the 14th century, and by the end of the next century there were already arguments and disputes over the British fishermen taking from Iceland’s presumed supply of cod, which was and is an integral part of the Icelandic dinner table and cultural identity. Over the centuries, global demand for seafood grew exponentially, and the presence of British ships in Icelandic waters became a growing concern as World War II came and went.
Finally, the first “shot” of the Cod Wars was fired in 1952, when Iceland expanded its territorial waters from three to four nautical miles, inspired by a similar ruling in favor of their Nordic neighbor Norway. There were also limitations placed on which waters the British ships could fish for cod. The United Kingdom retaliated by banning Icelandic fishing ships from their ports, but this backfired when Iceland began trading their fish to the Soviet Union instead. The United States, wary of any growing Soviet influence in Europe, stepped in to buy fish from Iceland, and convinced other European countries to follow suit. With the effects of the British ban nullified, they relented and recognized the four nautical mile border in 1956.
It would not take long for the fight for fish to be reignited. Two years later in 1958, Iceland passed a law that tripled its fishery zone from four to 12 nautical miles. This move was not appreciated by Britain, and in fact all of NATO opposed this sudden extension. The United Kingdom sent trawlers to these unrecognized new Icelandic waters to fish, with a military escort from the Royal Navy. Though practically the entirety of Europe was against them, Iceland remained defiant and fired warning shots at a fishing ship until the Royal Navy sent much larger warships to force the Icelandic ship to back down.
The British ships continued to collect cod, but there was still a significant financial cost to the United Kingdom, which ended up sending over 50 warships to the remote island nation, and diplomatic relations worsened as the Icelandic public held protests against England. It was only when Iceland threatened to leave NATO—thus removing the organization’s strategic access to the seas surrounding Iceland—that the rest of Europe stepped in and negotiated an agreement to give Iceland its 12 nautical mile border in 1961. The Cod Wars, it seemed, were finally over.
11 years later in 1972, the conflict was renewed as Iceland declared that they had extended their fishing limits to 50 nautical miles. Once again, the rest of Europe opposed this increase, but this time Iceland had something in their arsenal to more effectively defend their claims: net cutters. These worked similarly to underwater mine sweepers and would cut the wires connecting the nets to British trawlers, rendering the boat useless.
After over a dozen trawlers were affected, tensions mounted even further: boats began ramming into each other, warning shots made contact with hulls, and the Prime Minister of Iceland even asked the US to bomb British frigates. One of these spats turned fatal when an Icelandic engineer was electrocuted while making repairs. Once again, Iceland threatened to withdraw from NATO; the UK’s naval bases on the island would be forfeit, as well as their access to strategic waters. It was again too valuable of a trump card to ignore.
An agreement was reached that British ships would be allowed to fish only within certain areas of the 50 nautical mile border, and that their annual catch was limited. It was an uneasy agreement, with trawlers still escorted by frigates, and further arrests and warning shots continued. In 1975, the “Third Cod War” began when Iceland once again expanded their fishing limits to a whopping 200 nautical miles. Again, a series of ramming attacks followed over the next six months, including one that almost sank an Icelandic ship; by the end of the Third Cod War, there had been 55 ramming incidents, and one severe injury.
In the end, Iceland used the same tactic it had used to win all previous Cod Wars: threatening NATO. When the possibility of shutting down a NATO base on the island came around, the 200-mile fishing limit was accepted, and the Cod Wars were finally put to bed.
Iceland’s underdog success in the Cod Wars has been studied by international relations theorists to understand how the isolated island of less than half a million people consistently defeated a global superpower. While Iceland’s strategic value to NATO was hugely important, the issue was also much closer to the citizens of Iceland than their fishing rivals in Britain. Fish was, and still is, the main resource for the island, and though the English economy was negatively affected by losing the Cod Wars, Iceland’s economy would have ceased to exist.
The conflict has been the subject of extensive writing from diplomats and international relations scholars from Hans Morgenthau to Henry Kissinger. Sadly, the Cod Wars did little to prevent overfishing; it seems that cod is sometimes too popular for its own good.
